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We propose a theoretical framework to quantitatively describe Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), including
extensions to quantum protocols, so-called Quantum Readout PUFs (QR-PUFs). (QR-) PUFs are physical
systems with challenge-response behaviour intended to be hard to clone or simulate. Their use has been
proposed in several cryptographic protocols, with particular emphasis on authentication. By reviewing and
generalizing previous ideas, we design a general authentication scheme, which is applicable to existing and new
protocols for different physical implementations of both classical PUFs and (QR-) PUFs, and discuss the main
properties which quantify the security of such devices, namely the robustness and the unclonability. We aim
to find an agreement about theoretical assumptions and definitions behind the intuitive ideas of (QR-) PUFs,
improving our ability to quantitatively characterize the security of such devices in cryptographic protocols and
to compare the performances between different (QR-) PUFs. Such an agreement will allow us to derive security
thresholds for (QR-) PUF authentication and paves the way to develop further new authentication protocols.
1 Introduction
Authentication is a major task of both classical and
quantum cryptography. To achieve secure communica-
tion between two parties Alice and Bob, it is necessary
to ensure that no intruder may participate in the com-
munication, pretending to be one of the legitimate par-
ties, e.g. by a so-called Man-in-the-middle attack [1].
Authentication is ultimately classical, even in quantum
protocols like QKD [2].
The main ingredient of an authentication protocol is
a shared secret between the legitimate parties: during
any authenticated communication Alice and Bob must
prove the possession of this secret to confirm their iden-
tity. One has to distinguish two types of authentica-
tion [1]. Message authentication is the assurance that
a given entity was the original source of the received
data. This type of authentication can be achieved by
unconditionally secure protocols [3]. Entity authenti-
cation, on the other hand, is the assurance that a given
entity can prove its identity and its involvement in the
communication session to another entity.
Entity authentication is particularly important if
there is an asymmetry between the parties, e.g. when
one party, namely Alice, is a trusted institution and
the other one, namely Bob, is an untrusted user. The
communication between Alice and Bob may happen
on an authenticated channel owned by Alice, where
Bob interacts through a remote terminal. In that case,
a one-way entity authentication protocol will be used
by Alice to authenticate Bob and to allow him to use
her channel. Such protocols are usually based on a
challenge-response authentication, a type of authenti-
cation where Alice presents a challenge and Bob pro-
vides a valid response, based on the common secret,
to be authenticated. For instance, Alice can ask for a
password (challenge) and Bob will provide the correct
one (response).
In the case of asymmetric communication, it is use-
ful to design authentication protocols based on some-
thing the parties possess. The trusted Alice can still
be required to have secret knowledge since she is able
to conceal information from an adversary, but Bob is
required only to protect a given token from theft. A
crucial condition of this approach is that the object has
to be unique and an adversary, namely Eve, should not
be able to copy it easily.
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) [4] is a phys-
ical system which can interact in a very complex way
with an external signal (which can serve as a challenge)
to give an unpredictable output (which can serve as a
response). Its internal disorder is exploited to make
it unique, hard to clone or simulate. PUFs are par-
ticularly suited for entity authentication because their
internal structure plays the role of the shared secret.
They can also be used in other protocols, like oblivious
transfer [5], bit commitment [6] or classical key distri-
bution [7]. There is a large variety of PUFs, such as the
Optical PUF [8], the Arbiter PUF [9], the SRAM PUF
[10], the Coating PUF [11], the Magnetic PUF [12],
the Ring Oscillator PUF [13] and so on. A more de-
tailed description of the whole family of PUFs is given
in [14] and in [15].
To ensure reliability and security it is required to
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post-process the PUFs’ outputs [16, 17]. The most
common way to do it is by using the so-called fuzzy ex-
tractor [18], a tool which combines error correction and
privacy amplification. Error correction is indeed nec-
essary because the PUF’s output can be different each
time the PUF interacts with the same challenge, even
when the authentication involves the real Bob with the
original PUF. This can be due to an erroneous imple-
mentation of the challenge or to noise in the physical
process. Privacy amplification is important since the
outcome of a PUF is generally non-uniform, i.e. there
exist correlations between the different responses that
can be used by an adversary to undermine the PUF’s
security. Moreover, once the response is transformed
into a uniform key, it can then be used in different pro-
tocols other than entity authentication. For instance,
in the classical part of QKD, a secure key is required for
message authentication. Usually, this key is preshared
in the first round of the protocol, then a fraction of the
encryption key is used as the authentication key for the
following round [2].
However, even when dealing with noise and non-
uniformity, there are some issues with PUFs, because
it has been shown that many of them can be actually
cloned or simulated [19, 20, 21], compromising their
use in secure authentication schemes.
To solve these problems, an extension of PUFs to
quantum protocols was suggested, the so-called Quan-
tum Readout PUFs (QR-PUFs) [22]. Such PUFs en-
code challenges and responses in quantum states, thus
they are expected to be more secure and reliable than
classical PUFs, as they add a layer of complexity
given by the unclonability of the involved quantum
states [23]. Moreover, if such quantum states are non-
orthogonal, an adversary cannot perfectly distinguish
them, and an attempt to do it would introduce distur-
bances, thus exposing the presence of an intruder to
the legitimate parties.
It is desirable to establish a theoretical framework in
which one can perform a rigorous, quantitative, anal-
ysis of the security properties of (QR-) PUFs. Several
efforts have been made to formalize the intuitive ideas
of PUF [24, 25, 26, 27, 28], and they all capture some
aspects of them, but a well-defined agreement about
theoretical assumptions and definitions is still lacking.
Moreover, the previous approaches are devoted to clas-
sical PUFs only.
In this article we propose a common theoreti-
cal framework by quantitatively characterizing the
(QR-) PUF properties, particularly the robustness [25]
against noise and the unclonability. This is done by
generalizing ideas from previous approaches (in partic-
ular from [25]) to encompass both classical and QR-
PUFs. Moreover, we introduce a generic scheme for
authentication protocols with (QR-) PUFs, for which
security thresholds can be calculated once an experi-
mental implementation is specified. This scheme pro-
vides an abstract formalization of existing protocols,
together with new ideas such as the difference between
a physical layer and a mathematical layer (see Sec. 2)
or the concept of the shifter (see Sec. 4.1 and Sec.
5.1). This framework is designed to be independent of
the specific experimental implementation, such that a
comparison of different types of PUFs and QR-PUFs
becomes possible. In particular, all implementations
use a fuzzy extractor for post-processing. We expect
that this analysis supports both theoretical and exper-
imental research on (QR-) PUFs, by promoting the im-
plementation of such devices in existing and new secure
authentication schemes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
give an introduction on entity authentication protocols
with (QR-) PUFs. Section 3 contains the notation we
will use in the paper, in Section 4 we describe a proto-
col with a generic classical PUF, and in Section 5 we
generalize this to a generic QR-PUF. The shared for-
malization of the theoretical properties of (QR-) PUFs
is stated in Section 6 and the formalism is applied in
some examples in Sec. 7. Some final remarks and the
outlook of the work are given in the Conclusion.
2 Authentication protocols
In the following, we will always call Alice the party
that has to authenticate Bob. Mutual authentication
can be achieved by repeating the protocol swapping
the roles of Alice and Bob. Moreover, we stated in the
Introduction that the raw output of a (QR-) PUF has
to be post-processed to be used in secure cryptographic
protocols. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we call
outcome the raw output while we mean with response
only the post-processed uniform key.
Entity authentication protocols with (QR-) PUFs
consist of two phases [29], the enrollment stage and
the verification stage (see fig. 1).
The enrollment stage is a part of the protocol which
happens only once at the beginning, after the manu-
facture of the (QR-) PUF and before any communica-
tions between Alice and Bob. An entity, or a group of
entities, called the (QR-) PUF Certifier (which may
be the (QR-) PUF manufacturer, Alice itself, a third
trusted party or a combination of all of them) stud-
ies the (QR-) PUF’s properties, evaluates the param-
eters needed for the implementation and for the post-
processing. In particular, the Certifier selects a certain
number N of challenges and records the corresponding
responses. Challenges and responses form the so-called
Challenge-Response pairs (CRPs) and they are stored
as a Challenge-Response Table (CRT), together with
additional information needed in the remaining part of
the protocol. After the end of this stage, the Certifier
2
Figure 1: Top: a schematic description of the en-
rollment stage. The Certifier (orange) studies the
(QR-) PUF’s properties and generates the Challenge-
Response Table (CRT). Then the CRT is given to Al-
ice (blue) and the (QR-) PUF is given to Bob (green).
Bottom: a schematic description of the verification
stage. In the honest case, Bob lets Alice interact with
his (QR-) PUF through a terminal and she remotely
verifies his identity with the CRT. In the dishonest
case, an adversary Eve (red) claims to be Bob, let-
ting Alice interact with a clone of the (QR-) PUF, and
the protocol should lead to an abortion.
gives the CRT to Alice (which then knows the secret)
and the (QR-) PUF to Bob (which then has the secret).
The verification stage is the part of the protocol
where communication between Alice and Bob is nec-
essary. In this stage, Bob declares his identity to
Alice with his (QR-) PUF, remotely interacting with
her through her terminal. To authenticate Bob, Al-
ice sends randomly one challenge from the CRT to the
(QR-) PUF and collects the outcome, which is then
post-processed. The calculated response is compared
with the one in the CRT, i.e. the one obtained in the
enrollment stage. If they match, Alice authenticates
Bob. This stage can be repeated every time Alice needs
to authenticate Bob. After every round, however, the
used challenge-response pair has to be eliminated from
the CRT and cannot be used again 1.
Depending on the different types of (QR-) PUFs, the
challenges could be different types of physical quanti-
ties. For instance, optical PUFs are transparent mate-
rials filled with light scattering particles and therefore,
1It was argued [22] that in the QR-PUF case, challenge-
response pairs could be used again, because an adversary is not
able to gain full information about their state. Such claims need
to be quantitatively proven, here we continue as if any reused
CRP is insecure.
when a laser interacts with it, the output will form a
unique speckle pattern. If such a PUF is classical, the
challenge is the laser orientation and the outcome is the
intensity of some points in the speckle pattern [8]. In
case of a QR-PUF, the challenges and the outcomes are
quantum states [22]. However, challenges, outcomes
and responses are stored in the CRT as digital binary
strings, and the responses are used as authentication
keys.
There are two different layers involved in this proto-
col, a physical one, where the actual (QR-) PUF acts
as a physical evolution from input systems to output
systems, and a mathematical one, where a binary chal-
lenge string (which should represent the information on
how to implement the input system) is mapped into an
outcome string which is post-processed into a response
string. To deal with the two different layers, we de-
note as challenges (respectively outcomes or responses)
the strings in the mathematical layer, while the chal-
lenge states 2 (respectively outcome states or response
states) are the implementations in the physical layer.
This configuration is schematized in fig. 2.
3 Notation
In the article we will use the following conventions:
• Digital strings, like the challenges and the re-
sponses, are denoted by lowercase bold letters, for
instance, xi and rj for the i-th challenge and the
j-th response, respectively;
• Sets of digital strings are denoted by the calli-
graphic uppercase letters, e.g. X and R for the
set of challenges and responses, respectively;
• Random variables which take values from given
sets are denoted by uppercase italic letters, e.g. X
and R for challenges and responses, respectively;
• The physical classical states are denoted by the
vector symbol (right arrow), for instance, ~xi and
~rj for the i-th challenge state and the j-th response
state, respectively;
• The physical quantum states are denoted by the
usual ket notation, for instance, |xi〉 and |rj〉 for
the i-th challenge state and the j-th response state,
respectively;
• Maps are denoted by uppercase letters with a cir-
cumflex accent, e.g. Pˆ or Πˆ. In particular, the
Latin letters are used for maps between strings
and the Greek ones for maps between states.
2This term clearly comes from quantum physics, where it is
used to describe a vector in a Hilbert space. We will use the
term classical state in this article meaning a classical physical
quantity, either scalar or vectorial.
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Figure 2: A scheme of the two layers, the mathematical one (where the cryptographic protocol takes place) and
the physical one (where the (QR-) PUF acts). In the physical layer a challenge state is prepared according to
the information of the challenge (mathematical layer) and then the (QR-) PUF transforms it into an outcome
state. The state-dependent shifter (see Sections 4.1 and 5.1) maps the outcome state to a reference state. The
outcome in the mathematical layer contains the information about the implementation of the shifter and the
error in the reference state and is post-processed by the fuzzy extractor to give the response. Challenges and
responses are stored into (enrollment stage) or taken from (verification stage) the Challenge-Response Table
(CRT). See Sections 4 and 5 for a more detailed description.
4 Classical PUF
The realization of a challenge state may involve several
different steps, each of them with different experimen-
tal complexity.
Each step involves devices with a limited, even
though possibly large, number of different config-
urations and such configurations can be used to
parametrize the experimental system, resulting in our
ability to formalize the challenges through discrete
variables. A challenge is therefore defined as the bi-
nary string xi of length n representing the configura-
tion which realizes a given challenge state ~xi.
4.1 Enrollment
If a challenge consists of n bits, the total possible num-
ber of challenges is 2n. However, in practice, certain
challenges could represent states which are impossible
or hard to implement or they do not lead to a set of dis-
tinguishable responses. Therefore, the PUF Certifier
selects N ≤ 2n different challenges xi ∈ X ⊆ {0, 1}n,
where X ⊆ {0, 1}n is the set of all chosen challenges
and |X | = N .
Each xi ∈ X represents a challenge state ~xi which
can be experimentally realized and sent to the PUF.
For security purposes, the set of challenges X has to
be uniform, i.e. Sˆ(X) = |X |, where X is the random
variable which takes values from the set X and Sˆ(X) is
the Shannon entropy of X. An adversary should not be
able to characterize the set of challenges by studying
some of them. The Certifier is free to discard some
challenges from X if he finds some correlations in them.
This affects the number N of challenges and has to be
quantified for given experimental implementations.
The PUF acts as a deterministic function Πˆ, which
is supposed to have a complex structure. Any attempt
to give a full description of it should be unfeasible, even
for the Certifier itself. For a given challenge state ~xi,
Πˆ(~xi) = ~yi, where ~yi is denoted as outcome state.
To map the outcome state into an outcome string
we need to take into account the distribution of the
outcome states, but also any error which may have oc-
curred due to noise or wrong implementation of the
experimental system.
To each outcome state ~yi we can apply a state-
dependent operation, Ωˆi, which maps ~yi into a refer-
ence state, denoted by ~0, equal for all outcome states.
We call this operation a shifter. The importance of
using the shifters will be more clear when we discuss
QR-PUFs. The shifter simplifies the error verification
process, as each expected outcome is identical. We will
see that this is valuable if the measurement is quantum.
They are introduced for classical PUFs for consistency
with the quantum case, as we want to compare the two
cases in a common framework.
Nonetheless, some devices ascribable to shifters have
been used in some PUF implementations: for instance,
in optical PUFs [30], they have been implemented as
a spatial light modulator that transforms the complex
speckle pattern to a plane wave, which is the refer-
ence state. Only if the pattern is the expected one this
happens, otherwise, the outcome state is mapped into
another speckle pattern. Shifters can be designed also
for other PUFs, depending on which physical quantities
are implied in the outcome states. If the outcome state
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is already a binary value (like in the SRAM PUF [10])
the reference state can be the bit 0 and the shifters can
be realized by a gate implementing either the identity
or a bit flip operation, depending on the expected out-
come state. Whenever an outcome is determined by
the frequency of a signal (like in a ring oscillator PUF
[13]), a shifter can be a passband filter, and so on.
The Certifier can implement the corresponding
shifter for every outcome state, since he can character-
ize Πˆ(~xi), possibly repeating the PUF evaluation for
the same challenge state ~xi, to find a Ωˆi such that
Ωˆi
(
Πˆ(~xi)
)
= ~0.
We define ~oi := Ωˆi
(
Πˆ(~xi)
)
. While in the enrollment
stage, or in a noiseless verification stage, ~oi = ~0 by
definition, in reality ~oi will contain errors.
This error is mapped into the Hamming weight, i.e.
the number of bits that are different from 0, of a clas-
sical string oi, i.e. oi = 0lo = 00 . . . 0 if and only
if ~oi = ~0. The string has a length lo, dependent on
the experimental implementation of the shifter. In the
aforementioned example of an optical PUF, the plane
wave is focused onto an analyzer plane with a pinhole.
If ~oi = ~0 the light passes through this pinhole, and a
detector will click. Therefore the intensity of the light
on the analyzer plane outside the pinhole can be used
to find oi, and the resolution of the analyzer plane de-
termines the length lo.
The shifters convey information about the distribu-
tion of the outcome states (as they are designed on
them) and therefore indirectly about the PUF. We can
represent this information in terms of binary strings
in the mathematical layer, just as we did for challenge
states. The shifters are implemented by an experimen-
tal device (or a collection of them) with a limited num-
ber of configurations, each one of them implementing
a different Ωˆi. Parametrizing such configurations, we
map each shifter Ωˆi in a string wi ∈ W ⊆ {0, 1}lw .
This string is exact, because it represents only the cor-
rect implementation of the shifter, without taking into
account any noise. The length lw depends on the en-
tropy of the shifters and, consequently, on the outcome
states (for some implementations, methods to analyze
such an entropy have been derived [31, 32]). The en-
tropy of W has to be studied also to verify the pres-
ence of non-uniformity, i.e. correlations between differ-
ent outcomes or between challenges and corresponding
outcomes. This entropy affects the unclonability of the
PUF (see Sec. 6).
The two strings oi and wi convey two different as-
pects of the outcome state. In fact, oi gives informa-
tion about the error only, without distinguishing dif-
ferent outcomes. Instead, wi gives information about
the distribution of the outcome states, but not about
errors (even a single bit flip of wi changes it into wj 6=i).
We combine oi and wi by defining as outcome a
string yi of length l = lw + lo, such that
yi = wi ‖oi , (1)
where ‖ is the concatenation of strings.
We designate Y ⊆ {0, 1}l as the set of all outcomes,
including all possible noisy versions. Explicitly,
Y = {yi = wi ‖oi, wi ∈ W, oi ∈ {0, 1}lo} , (2)
and |Y| = 2lo N (see fig. 3 for a graphic representation
of the set Y). Moreover we define a function Pˆ : X →
Y, associating each challenge with the corresponding
outcome, i.e. Pˆ (xi) = yi.
Figure 3: Graphic representation of the set Y, accord-
ing to Eq. (2). The centers of the circles represent the
noiseless outcomes yi = wi‖0lo for different wi ∈ W,
while every point in the corresponding outer circles, of
radius lo, represents a noisy version of them. Between
different outcomes, including the noisy versions, there
is no overlap, because wi 6= wj for i 6= j. A fuzzy ex-
tractor can correct t < lo bit errors, i.e. the outcomes
inside the inner circles.
To reduce the noise and improve the uniformity, we
have to post-process the outcome. The most common
way to do it is through a fuzzy extractor [18], which is
a combined error correction and privacy amplification
scheme:
Definition 4.1. Let {0, 1}? be the star closure of
{0, 1}, i.e. the set of strings of arbitrary length:
{0, 1}? =
⋃
i≥0
{0, 1}i , (3)
where {0, 1}0 = ∅ is the empty set. Moreover let
Hˆ(yi,y
′
i) be the Hamming distance between yi and
y′i, i.e. the Hamming weight of yi + y
′
i and s :=
− log (maxk pk) be the min-entropy of a probability
distribution p = { pk }. Finally, given two probabil-
ity distributions pA, pB , associated to discrete random
variables A,B with the same domain C, let DˆS(pA, pB)
be the statistical distance between pA and pB , i.e.
DˆS(pA, pB) :=
1
2
∑
c∈C
|Pr(A = c)− Pr(B = c)| . (4)
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A (Y, s,m, t, )-fuzzy extractor is a pair of random
functions, the generation function Gˆ and the reproduc-
tion function Rˆ, with the following properties:
• Gˆ : Y → {0, 1}m × {0, 1}? on input yi ∈ Y out-
puts an extracted string ri ∈ R ⊆ {0, 1}m and a
helper data hi ∈ H ⊆ {0, 1}?. While ri has to be
kept secret, hi can be made public (it can even be
physically attached to the PUF);
• Rˆ : Y ×H → {0, 1}m takes an element y′i ∈ Y and
a helper string hi ∈ H as inputs. The correctness
property of a fuzzy extractor guarantees that if
Hˆ(yi,y
′
i) ≤ t and (ri,hi) = Gˆ(yi), then Rˆ(y′i) =
ri;
• The security property guarantees that for any
probability distribution on Y of min-entropy s, the
string ri is nearly uniform even for those who ob-
serve hi: i.e. if (ri,hi) = Gˆ(yi), then
DˆS(pRH , pUH) ≤  , (5)
where pRH (pUH) is a joint probability distribution
for ri ∈ R (for a uniformly distributed variable on
m-bit binary strings) and hi ∈ H.
The fuzzy extractor has to uniquely map a given
outcome into a response, without collisions. Due to
noise or an erroneous experimental setup, a challenge
state ~xi can be implemented as a state which is closer
to ~xj , for i 6= j. The error o(j)i associated to Ωˆi
(
Πˆ(~xj)
)
for i 6= j, must be uncorrectable: the Certifier has to
choose a maximum allowed error t < lo smaller than
the minimum Hamming weight of o(j)i , over all i 6= j
(see Fig. 4).
Figure 4: Graphic representation of the choice of t for
N = 2 challenge-response pairs. The circle represents
both o1 and o2, indipendently from w1 and w2. The
center of the circle represent the noiseless cases o1 =
o2 = 0lo and all the noisy cases lie in a circle of radius
lo. The errors o
(2)
1 and o
(1)
2 define two rings and t is
chosen smaller than the radius of the smaller one (in
our case o(1)2 ).
There is a trade-off between t and the entropy of the
shifters: a high entropy, associated to a longer length
λw of wi, is equivalent to similar states with a small
error in case of a wrong implementation, and t has
to be chosen low. The Certifier may decide to delete
challenge-response pairs from the Challenge-Response
Table, in order to choose a higher t and increase the
resistance of the PUF against the noise.
For practical purposes we define two functions GˆR
and GˆH such that
Gˆ(·) = (GˆR(·), GˆH(·)) , (6)
and therefore ri = GˆR(yi) and hi = GˆH(yi) for yi ∈ Y.
Moreover, we define the function FˆE to be the function
mapping each challenge to the respective response in
the enrollment stage, i.e.
FˆE(·) := GˆR(Pˆ (·)) , (7)
for xi ∈ X and therefore ri = FˆE(xi).
Summarising, during the enrollment stage the Cer-
tifier creates a set of N challenges X ∈ {0, 1}n and a
set of N responses R ⊆ {0, 1}m
R =
{
ri ∈ {0, 1}m
∣∣∣ ri = FˆE(xi); xi ∈ X } . (8)
They are stored into the Challenge-Response Table
(CRT) together with
• the set of N strings wi representing how to set the
shifter operator to get the correct outcome;
• the parameters of the fuzzy extractor;
• the (possibly public) set of helper data H ⊆
{0, 1}?, i.e.
H =
{
hi ∈ {0, 1}?
∣∣∣ hi = GˆH(Pˆ (xi)); xi ∈ X } .
(9)
The Challenge-Response Table is given to Alice and
the PUF to Bob, concluding the enrollment stage.
4.2 Verification
In the verification stage Bob declares his identity by
giving his PUF to Alice. She picks up a randomly
selected challenge xj ∈ X (for which she knows the
response rj = FˆE(xj)) and she prepares the challenge
state ~xj . The PUF is applied to ~xj , leading to the out-
come Πˆ(~xj). Then she tunes the shifter Ωˆj , according
to the CRT and evaluates Ωˆj
(
Πˆ(~xj)
)
.
Applying the PUF and the shifter to the challenge
state, she may obtain a noisy version of ~yj , because of
noise or of a wrong preparation of the challenge state.
Alternatively, Bob may not be the real Bob, and there-
fore the noise could come from the PUF not being the
original one. We call this noisy version ~y′j = Πˆ(e)(~xj).
In that case Ωˆj(~y′j) 6= ~0, which leads to o′j 6= 0lo such
6
that y′j = wj ‖o′j = Pˆ (e)(xj) is different from the yj
obtained by the Certifier in the enrollment stage.
The outcome is then post-processed by the repro-
duction function of a fuzzy extractor, so Alice collects
zj := FˆV (xj), where the function FˆV represents the
map between the challenges and the corresponding re-
sponses in the verification stage, i.e.
FˆV := Rˆ
(
Pˆ (e)(·), GˆH(Pˆ (·))
)
, (10)
for xj ∈ X .
The claimed response zj is compared with the one
in the CRT: if zj = rj, Bob is authenticated, otherwise
the protocol fails.
5 QR-PUF
The Quantum Readout PUF still uses classical chal-
lenges and responses in the mathematical layer, and
also a classical fuzzy extractor procedure, but the
implementation of the challenge states and outcome
states in the physical layer is done via quantum states.
At the moment, the only classical PUF which was ex-
tended to a QR-PUF is an optical PUF [22, 30], for
which there are some studies on side-channel attacks
[33, 34, 35].
In this work, we study discrete qubit states, but
our approach could also be generalized to continuous-
variable (QR-) PUFs [36, 37].
Let us assume to work with λ qubits, so challenge
states are elements of the Hilbert space C2λ . We also
assume that each qubit can be in a finite number of
states. Like in the classical case, we can parametrize
the configurations of the experimental system that im-
plements the challenge states, to obtain a set X of
classical challenges. Let us denote the length of such
strings by n, to match the case of classical PUFs. Since
not all states are implementable, or they don’t lead
to distinguishable responses, the total number of chal-
lenges xi ∈ X ⊆ {0, 1}n is N ≤ 2n. Here the challenge
states are quantum, therefore challenge states will be
represented by |xi〉. Our QR-PUF will be described in
an idealized way, as unitary operation acting on a pure
state to produce another pure state. In reality, this
process will introduce noise: in our framework, this
will be taken into account in the transition from the
outcome state to the outcome string.
5.1 Enrollment
The Certifier selects the N challenges xi ∈ X , where
X is implemented by a set of nonorthogonal states
{ |x1〉 , . . . , |xN 〉 } ∈ C2λ . The nonorthogonality is ex-
pected to be a crucial condition, since, as a consequence
of the no-cloning theorem [23], there does not exist a
measurement which perfectly distinguishes nonorthog-
onal states. We expect that this enhances the secu-
rity of QR-PUFs over classical PUFs since an adver-
sary could gain only a limited amount of information
about the challenge and the outcome states. In this
work we consider separable challenge states |xi〉, so
|xi〉 =
⊗λ
k=1 |xik〉 and we can deal with single qubit
states |xik〉. The procedure can be generalized to other
challenge states. The qubit states can be written in
terms of some complete orthonormal basis, which we
denote as { |0〉 , |1〉 }:
|xik〉 = cos θik |0〉+ eiϕik sin θik |1〉 , (11)
where θik ∈ [0, pi] and ϕik ∈ [0, 2pi].
The Certifier sends all states to the QR-PUF, col-
lecting the outcome states. The QR-PUF is formalized
as a λ-fold tensor product of single-qubit unitary gates
Φˆ =
⊗λ
k=1 Φˆk. Despite its form being unknown, it can
be parametrized by [38]:
Φˆk(ωk, ψk, χk) =
(
eiψk cosωk e
iχk sinωk
−e−iχk sinωk e−iψk cosωk
)
,
(12)
with random parameters ψk, χk ∈ [0, 2pi] and ωk ∈[
0, pi2
]
. The outcome state is then |yi〉 =
⊗λ
k=1 |yik〉,
where
|yik〉 = Φˆk |xik〉
=
(
eiψk cosωk cos θik + e
i(χk+ϕik) sinωk sin θik
−e−iχk sinωk cos θik + ei(ϕik−ψk) cosωk sin θik
)
.
(13)
Like in the classical case, the Certifier can design a
state-dependent shifter, that performs a tensor product
of unitary transformations, Ωˆi =
⊗λ
k=1 Ωˆik, each one
of them mapping a specific qubit state to the reference
state |0〉 = (1, 0)T . This operation is indeed unitary,
because for |yik〉 = cosαik |0〉+eiβik sinαik |1〉, it holds
that Ωˆik |yik〉 = |0〉 for
Ωˆik =
(
cosαik e
−iβik sinαik
eiβik sinαik − cosαik
)
, (14)
which verifies Ωˆik Ωˆ
†
ik = Ωˆ
†
ik Ωˆik = I, where I is the
identity operator. The Certifier can implement Ωˆi for
each Φˆ |xi〉, because he can repeat the experiment and
characterize each outcome state by performing quan-
tum state tomography or, as we work with pure states,
compressed sensing [39].
Instead of having to change the single-qubit mea-
surement basis for each qubit and each challenge, by
applying the suitable shifter it is now possible to use
the basis { |0〉 , |1〉 } for all qubits of all challenges.
By definition of Ωˆik, if there is no error, we will mea-
sure for every qubit the state |0〉, and the results of the
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Figure 5: A scheme for the verification stage for QR-PUFs, as described in Sec. 5.2. Bob provides the QR-
PUF (Φˆ, here enclosed in a green box) and Alice uses quantities stored in the Challenge-Response Table (here
enclosed in blue boxes) to evaluate a response zj for a challenge xj. Authentication succeeds if zj = rj, where
rj is the response stored in the CRT. The verification stage for classical PUFs (as described in Sec. 4.2) can
be obtained by substituting in the physical layer (the inner box) quantum states and operators with classical
states and operators, and by leaving the mathematical layer (outer box) unchanged.
measurement form a string of length λ made by all ze-
ros, oi = 0 = 00 . . . 0. If there is some error, which in
the quantum case is introduced by either the environ-
ment or an adversary, the Hamming weight of oi will
give us an estimate of it.
Like in the classical case, we can parametrize the
experimental system that implements the shifters in
terms of the (discrete) configuration it must assume
to implement a specific Ωˆi. Therefore, a given Ωˆi is
represented by a classical string wi ∈ W of length lw.
We again define as outcome a classical string yi of
length l = lw + λ, given by:
yi = wi ‖oi , (15)
where ‖ is the concatenation of strings.
We also define a set Y like in Eq. (2) and a function
Pˆ : X → Y mapping every challenge to the correspond-
ing outcome.
At this point, like for classical PUFs, the Certifier
fixes the correctable amount of noise t < lo and se-
lects a fuzzy extractor (Gˆ, Rˆ), able to correct t er-
rors and to generate a uniformly distributed response,
according to the distribution of the outcome states
and the entropy of the set of outcomes. The non-
orthogonality of the challenge states affects t: when a
wrong challenge state is implemented, its fidelity with
the correct one is preserved by the QR-PUF and the
shifter, since they are unitary maps, and influences
the results of the measurement. The maximum cor-
rectable error t has to be chosen lower than the error
produced by wrong implementations, which becomes
small for highly non-orthogonal challenges. The Certi-
fier may decide to delete challenge-response pairs from
the Challenge-Response Table, in order to choose a
higher t and increase the resistance of the QR-PUF
against the noise. However, this reduces the overall
non-orthogonality of the quantum states, thus improv-
ing Eve’s ability to distinguish them. Such a trade-off
will be discussed again in the following Sections.
The generation function of a fuzzy extractor gener-
ates a uniformly distributed response ri ∈ R, together
with a public helper data hi ∈ H. Again we have:
Gˆ(·) = (GˆR(·), GˆH(·)) , (16)
and
ri = GˆR(yi), ∀yi ∈ Y . (17)
We define a function FˆE(·) := GˆR(Pˆ (·)) : X →
R mapping each challenge to the corresponding re-
sponse, representing the action of the QR-PUF in
the enrollment stage. Like for classical PUFs, chal-
lenges, responses and other information are stored in
the Challenge-Response Table, which is given to Alice,
while the QR-PUF is given to Bob.
5.2 Verification
In the verification stage Bob gives his QR-PUF to Al-
ice, who selects randomly a challenge xj ∈ X and pre-
pares |xj〉.
Applying the QR-PUF to the challenge state |xj〉,
Alice may obtain |y′j〉, different from the expected |yj〉,
because of noise or an erroneous implementation of the
system or the action of a malicious intruder. Then
Alice applies Ωˆj and measures each qubit state in the
basis { |0〉 , |1〉 }, obtaining o′j. In the ideal noiseless
case, o′j = 0lo , but since we may measure some state
|1〉 for some qubits, y′j = wj ‖o′j could be different from
the yj obtained by the Certifier.
The action of the reproduction function of the fuzzy
extractor gives zj = Rˆ(Pˆ (e)(xj)). We define FV : X →
R such that FV (xj) = zj.
Authentication succeeds if FE(xj) = FV (xj). The
verification stage is schematized in fig. 5.
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6 Properties and formalization
In this section, we will analyze the properties of (QR-)
PUFs. As we saw, both PUFs and QR-PUFs can
be represented by a classical pair of functions Fˆ =
(FˆE , FˆV ), representing the map between challenges and
responses in the enrollment or the verification stage
(see Eq. (7) and (10)). We will keep the same formal-
ism for both PUFs and QR-PUFs, to allow our frame-
work to compare them, but we will also specify the
practical differences.
We have seen that the noise can be a problem which
can lead to false rejection in the protocols. Therefore it
is important to characterize and quantify the amount
of noise of a (QR-) PUF, which is connected to the
robustness of a (QR-) PUF. We take the definition of
this concept from [25], adapting it to our framework
and our formalism.
Definition 6.1. Let us consider a (QR-) PUF Fˆ with
a set of challenges X .
Fˆ is ρ-robust with respect to X if ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the
greatest number for which
1
|X |
|X |∑
i=1
Pr{FˆV (xi) = FˆE(xi)} ≥ ρ . (18)
ρ is called the robustness of the (QR-) PUF with
respect to X .
The robustness represents the average probability
that the (QR-) PUF in the verification stage outputs
the correct response, such that the authentication suc-
ceeds. So it represents the (QR-) PUF’s ability to avoid
false rejections and depends on many factors, e.g. on
the average noise of the specific implementation and
the parameters of the fuzzy extractor.
Regarding the robustness, we do not expect a signif-
icant advantage of QR-PUFs over classical PUFs. Ac-
tually, there is the possibility to have a disadvantage,
because of the fragility of quantum states and of the
necessity of having a low error threshold t, as the noise
can originate from a possible interaction of an adver-
sary. Any implementation with QR-PUFs has to pay
special care to this issue.
Now we will discuss unclonability, which is the main
parameter involved in attacks from an adversary Eve.
This concept is also mildly inspired by [25], but with
marked differences, mainly caused by the need of tak-
ing into account QR-PUFs. In the context of entity
authentication with (QR-) PUF, the purpose of an ad-
versary Eve is to create a clone of a (QR-) PUF, such
that Alice can verify with it a challenge-response pair,
falsely authenticating her as Bob.
When we say clone, we need to specify if we are
talking of a physical or a mathematical one. A physi-
cal clone is an experimental reproduction of the (QR-)
PUF. It will have the same physical properties as the
original one, even in contexts not involved with the
authentication protocol. The requirement of physical
unclonability means that a physical clone is technolog-
ically or financially unfeasible at the current state of
technology.
A mathematical clone, instead, is an object that
simulates the challenge-response behaviour of a (QR-)
PUF. In this case, we cannot just state that a math-
ematical clone is unfeasible, because if there are some
correlations between the outcome states, in principle
they can be exploited to predict new challenge-response
pairs. As mentioned in the introduction, several PUFs
have been successfully mathematically cloned. We
need to formalize this notion, in order to quantify it
for different (QR-) PUFs.
We assume that Eve cannot directly access the in-
ternal structure of the (QR-) PUF [24, 40], but only
interact with the challenge and the outcome states. An
attack consists of two phases, both carried out during
the verification stage of the protocol. We require that
the enrollment stage is inaccessible to Eve since this
part is performed in the Certifier’s lab and it involves
the study of the inner structure of the (QR-) PUF. Dur-
ing the passive phase, Eve observes a certain number
of successful authentications with the real (QR-) PUF,
collecting as much information as she can. Then, dur-
ing the active phase she designs a clone and gives it to
Alice, claiming to be Bob. The attack succeeds if she
is authenticated as Bob.
Each interaction affects one challenge-response pair.
In this context, there is a crucial difference between
PUFs and QR-PUFs. Classical states can be measured
without introducing disturbances and can be copied
perfectly. Therefore for q ≤ N interactions, we can
assume that Eve would know exactly q challenge and
outcome states, possibly using this information to cre-
ate a mathematical clone of the PUF.
Instead, a quantum state cannot be copied. More-
over, a quantum measurement cannot perfectly dis-
tinguish the states (since they are non-orthogonal)
and any measurement can in principle introduce er-
rors, thus potentially making a passive eavesdrop a de-
tectable action. After q interactions, Eve would know
less than q challenge and outcome states. This is the
main reason for which QR-PUFs have been introduced,
because we expect that, concerning unclonability, they
can be superior than classical PUFs 3.
Definition 6.2. Let Fˆ be a (QR-) PUF with a set of
challenges X and a set of responses R. Let us suppose
that an adversary Eve has q interactions with a (QR-)
3As we mentioned in Sec. 5.1, highly non-orthogonal chal-
lenge states require a fuzzy extractor with a low correctable er-
ror, undermining the robustness of the QR-PUF. Therefore this
feature of QR-PUFs must be used carefully, balancing robustness
and unclonability.
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PUF in the passive stage of an attack, by observing an
authentication protocol between Alice and Bob. With
the information she can extract, she prepares a clone
Eˆq, and gives it to Alice, who selects a challenge xi ∈ X
and evaluates ei = Eˆq(xi) := Rˆ
(
PˆE(xi), GˆH(Pˆ (xi))
)
.
Then Eˆq is a (γ, q)-(mathematical) clone of Fˆ if γ ∈
[0, 1] is the greatest number for which
1
|X |
|X |∑
i=1
Pr(Eˆq(xi) = FˆE(xi)) ≥ γ . (19)
Definition 6.3. A (QR-) PUF Fˆ is called (γ, q)-
(mathematical) clonable if γ ∈ [0, 1] is the smallest
number for which it is not possible to generate a (γ¯, q)
clone of the (QR-) PUF for any γ¯ > γ.
Conversely, a (QR-) PUF Fˆ is denoted as (δ, q)-
(mathematical) unclonable if it is (1− δ, q)-clonable.
The unclonability of a (QR-) PUF is therefore re-
lated to the average probability of false acceptance.
We could expect to find a relation between the num-
ber of interactions q and the unclonability: with a
higher knowledge of CRP, it could be expected that
Eve will be able to build a more and more sophisti-
cated reproduction of the (QR-) PUF. Increasing q in-
creases the know-how for making (1− δ, q)-clones with
a lower δ. Therefore, fixing the maximum number of
uses q = q∗ we fix the minimum δ = δ∗. So we ensure
that for q < q∗, the (QR-) PUF is at least (δ∗, q)-
unclonable.
Definition 6.4. A (ρ, δ∗, q∗) (QR-) PUF Fˆ is ρ-
robust, physically unclonable and at least (δ∗, q)-
mathematically unclonable up to q∗ uses.
When manufacturing (QR-) PUFs several properties,
that are typically implementation-dependent, are im-
portant [15]. We believe that the above theoretical
definitions of robustness and unclonability are, from a
theoretical point of view, the main and most general
properties involved in a (QR-) PUF. They are directly
related to the probabilities of false rejection and false
acceptance, hence describing the efficiency and the se-
curity of the entity authentication protocol. Moreover,
as the final response can be used as a key for other pro-
tocols (such as message authentication), these proper-
ties can be used to estimate the security of other pro-
tocols involving (QR-) PUFs. They also describe all
(QR-) PUFs independently from their implementation.
7 Examples
Explicit calculation of the robustness and the unclon-
ability for a particular (QR-) PUFs strongly depends
on its implementation. In this section, we illustrate the
analysis for simplified examples.
• Consider a physically unclonable device imple-
menting a true random number generator. This
device is extremely difficult to copy (Eve has to
try a random guess), but also not robust at all
(since it will not generate the same number in the
enrollment and in the verification). For this de-
vice, it holds
1
|X |
|X |∑
i=1
Pr{FˆV (xi) = FˆE(xi)} = 1|X | ;
1
|X |
|X |∑
i=1
Pr(Eˆq∗(xi) = FˆE(xi)) =
1
|X | .
(20)
Therefore it is a (1/|X |, 1−1/|X |, q∗) (QR-) PUF,
for any q∗.
• A physically unclonable device that outputs a
fixed signal (~0 for classical PUFs or |0〉 for QR-
PUFs) for any input is perfectly robust, but also
clonable. It holds
1
|X |
|X |∑
i=1
Pr{FˆV (xi) = FˆE(xi)} = 1 ;
1
|X |
|X |∑
i=1
Pr(Eˆq∗(xi) = FˆE(xi)) = 1 .
(21)
Therefore the (QR-) PUF is a (1, 0, q∗) (QR-)
PUF, for any q∗.
These examples are extreme cases, while all (QR-)
PUFs will be somewhere in between. We now focus on
an example of QR-PUF, to point out some features of
QR-PUFs and some open points.
Let Fˆ be a QR-PUF implemented by a unitary trans-
formation Φˆ, acting on λ qubits, parametrized accord-
ing to Eq. (12), with ψk = χk = 0, i.e.
Φˆ =
λ⊗
k=1
Φˆk =
λ⊗
k=1
(
cosωk sinωk
− sinωk cosωk
)
. (22)
Let us consider a scenario in which each challenge
state is a separable state of λ qubits, |xi〉 =
⊗λ
k=1 |xik〉,
and each qubit is in one of four possible states
|xik〉 = |x(`)ik 〉 := cos
(
φ(`)
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
φ(`)
2
)
|1〉 ,
(23)
where
φ(1) = φ , φ(2) = −φ ,
φ(3) = φ− pi , φ(4) = pi − φ ,
(24)
for a fixed angle φ. Such challenge states can be
parametrized by challenge strings of length n = 2λ:
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for each qubit, the four possibilities are represented by
two bits. For simplicity of notation, from now on, we
drop the indices i and k, e.g.
∣∣x(`)〉 := ∣∣∣x(`)ik 〉. The
pairs {∣∣x(1)〉 , ∣∣x(3)〉} and {∣∣x(2)〉 , ∣∣x(4)〉} are orthogo-
nal, but the overall set is non-orthogonal.
We assume that the noise can be parametrized as
a depolarizing channel, associated to a probability of
error p˜ and equal for all qubits. The noisy challenge
state reads:
ρ˜x := (1− p˜) |x〉 〈x|+ p˜ Iˆ
2
=
[
(1− p˜) cos2
(
φ′
2
)
+
p˜
2
]
|0〉 〈0|
+
[
(1− p˜) sin
(
φ′
2
)
cos
(
φ′
2
)]
(|0〉 〈1|+ |1〉 〈0|)
+
[
(1− p˜) sin2
(
φ′
2
)
+
p˜
2
]
|1〉 〈1| .
(25)
The shifter needs to map the noiseless outcome state
to |0〉 . . . |0〉. According to Eq.(14) it can be chosen to
be a λ-fold tensor product of single qubit gates
Ωˆ = cos
(
φ′
2
− ω
)
|0〉 〈0|+ sin
(
φ′
2
− ω
)
|0〉 〈1|
+ sin
(
φ′
2
− ω
)
|1〉 〈0| − cos
(
φ′
2
− ω
)
|1〉 〈1| ,
(26)
and it follows:
ρ˜o := Ωˆ ρ˜y Ωˆ
† =
(
1− p˜
2
)
|0〉 〈0|+
(
p˜
2
)
|1〉 〈1| . (27)
For a single qubit, therefore, the probability of mea-
suring |1〉 is p˜/2. For a challenge state of λ qubits, the
average Hamming weight of the string oi is λ p˜/2.
Any fuzzy extractor is defined in terms of the maxi-
mum number of errors t it can correct. With our error
model, we can choose to correct the average error of
the system, i.e. t = dλ p˜/2e, where dλ p˜/2e is the least
integer greater than or equal to λ p˜/2. However, t and
the number N of challenge-response pairs are related
since the fuzzy extractor has to uniquely map a given
outcome into a unique response, without collisions.
Consider
∣∣x(`)〉 and ∣∣∣x(`′)〉 (`, `′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and
` 6= `′) and estimate the error if ∣∣x(`)〉 is implemented
as the state
∣∣∣x(`′)〉, by evaluating Ωˆ` Φˆ ∣∣∣x(`′)〉. From
∣∣∣x(`)〉 = cos(φ(`)
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
φ(`)
2
)
|1〉 ,
∣∣∣x(`′)〉 = cos(φ(`′)
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
φ(`
′)
2
)
|1〉 ,
(28)
it follows
Ωˆ` Φˆ
∣∣∣x(`′)〉
= cos
(
φ(`) − φ(`′)
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
φ(`) − φ(`′)
2
)
|1〉 .
(29)
Therefore, for this case, the probability of measur-
ing |1〉 is sin2
(
φ(`)−φ(`′)
2
)
. In the following table, the
explicit values for all the combinations of the 4 qubit
states are listed. It can be noticed that challenges with
a large overlap lead to small error weights in case of the
wrong shifter, while orthogonal challenges lead to big
ones. Therefore there is a trade-off between the ro-
bustness of the QR-PUF and the quantum advantage
of using indistinguishable non-orthogonal states.∣∣x(1)〉 ∣∣x(2)〉 ∣∣x(3)〉 ∣∣x(4)〉∣∣x(1)〉 0 sin2 φ 1 cos2 φ∣∣x(2)〉 sin2 φ 0 cos2 φ 1∣∣x(3)〉 1 cos2 φ 0 sin2 φ∣∣x(4)〉 cos2 φ 1 sin2 φ 0
Table 1: Error induced by implementing the wrong
challenge state: the entry in row ` and column `′ of the
table is the probability of error when applying shifter
` to state `′. The parameter φ is defined in Eq. (24).
For any pair of possible challenge states |xi〉 =⊗λ
k=1 |xik〉 and |xj〉 =
⊗λ
k=1 |xjk〉, the average Ham-
ming weight of the error string oi, obtained by the
aforementioned process, is
erri,j := (n12 + n34) sin
2 φ+ (n13 + n24)
+ (n14 + n23) cos
2 φ ,
(30)
where nab counts how many times |xik〉 =
∣∣x(`)〉 when
|xjk〉 =
∣∣∣x(`′)〉 (or viceversa).
If erri,j < dλ p˜/2e, then the Certifier should discard
one of the two challenges, either xi or xj, thus reduc-
ing the number N of possible challenge-response pairs.
After this selection is repeated for all pairs of chal-
lenges, the Certifier studies the entropy of the set of
shifters, determining the strings wi and the outcomes
yi = wi ‖oi.
The Canetti’s reusable fuzzy extractor [41] is able to
correct up to t = (l ln l/m) bits, where l is the length
of the outcomes and m the length of the responses.
As l = λ + lw is fixed, m has to be adapted to the
noise level dλ p˜/2e. The correctness property of this
fuzzy extractor guarantees that an error smaller than
t is corrected with probability 1− %˜, where
%˜ =
(
1−
(
1− t
l
)m)ξ1
+ ξ1ξ2 , (31)
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with ξ1 and ξ2 being computational parameters of the
fuzzy extrator (in [41], to which we refer for a more
detailed explanation, they are denoted, respectively, as
` and γ). Then the robustness of this QR-PUF is 1− %˜.
Concerning the unclonability, one should relate the
amount of information Eve obtains from the (possibly
correlated) challenge-response pairs to her ability to
create a mathematical clone of the QR-PUF. Unfortu-
nately, there is no general method known to provide
this relation. We can show, though, that QR-PUFs
prevent an adversary Eve to gain too much information
about challenges and responses, thus strongly hinder-
ing her ability to learn the Challenge-Response Table.
As the optimal global attack on the challenge states
is unknown, unless knowing all challenge states, here
we consider an attack that acts individually on qubits.
In particular, we consider the case for which, on each
qubit, Eve can apply a 1→ 2 cloning operator, i.e. she
can intercept each qubit of a challenge state during
an authentication round to produce two (imperfect)
copies, one of which is given back to the legitimate
parties and the other is kept for herself. For such a set
of states, the optimal cloning tranformation, i.e. the
transformation who keeps the highest possible fidelity
between the copies and the original states, has been
derived [42] and for any challenge state |xi〉 and its
optimal copy ρEi holds:
F (|xi〉 〈xi| , %Ei ) :=
λ∏
k=1
〈
xik
∣∣ %Eik ∣∣xik〉
=
(
1
2
(
1 +
√
sin4 φ+ cos4 φ
))λ
.
(32)
For fixed λ, the minimum value of the fidelity is
reached for φ = pi/4, for which, considering a single
qubit, F = (0.85). Already for 10 qubits the fidelity
drops to F = (0.20), and for 20 qubits, F = (0.04).
Thus, Eve is not able to successfully simulate the
challenge-response behaviour, as she cannot even re-
construct the challenge and outcome states. Moreover,
as the fidelity is preserved by unitary matrices, this re-
sult holds also for the expected outcome state |yi〉 and
the actual outcome state Alice obtains after challeng-
ing the QR-PUF with her (unwittingly altered by the
cloning process) challenge state. The noise is too high
to be corrected by the fuzzy extractor, thus aborting
the authentication protocol and exposing the presence
of an intruder.
For classical PUFs, instead, Eve could perfectly read
the challenge and outcome states, without being no-
ticed. This provides an advantage of QR-PUFs over
classical PUFs in terms of unclonability. However, we
also noticed that a high non-orthogonality of the chal-
lenges can, in principle, undermine the robustness. The
trade-off between the advantages and disadvantages of
QR-PUFs has to be studied in order to find secure ap-
plications of them.
8 Conclusion
In this article, we proposed a theoretical framework
for the quantitative characterisation of both PUFs and
QR-PUFs. After developing an authentication protocol
common to both typologies, with the same error cor-
rection and privacy amplification scheme, we formal-
ized the (QR-) PUFs in term of two main properties,
the robustness (connected to false rejection) and the
unclonability (connected to false acceptance). Finally,
we studied some examples, motivating the possible ad-
vantages and disadvantages of QR-PUFs over classical
PUFs.
Our framework is useful to study and to compare
different implementations of (QR-) PUFs and to de-
velop new authentication schemes. An important ap-
plication would be to strictly prove the superiority of
QR-PUFs over classical PUFs. The next step towards
that goal would be the development of new methods to
estimate the unclonability of (QR-) PUFs for different
implementations. This could open an interesting line
of theoretical and experimental research about (QR-)
PUFs. Furthermore, our framework can be employed
to determine the level of security of using (QR-) PUFs
in other cryptographic protocols, like QKD.
Note added: During the finalisation of this work,
we became aware of a preprint on a related topic
(arXiv:1910.02126).
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